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W

hy has ending the war in Afghanistan proved to be so problematic? In
theory, the decision to end a war should be relatively straightforward.
One or more of the belligerents determine whether or not it is worth continuing the conflict and, as long as at least one of them decides that continuing to
fight is not worth the investment, peace is offered and the conflict terminates.
Clausewitz encapsulates this rational, commonsense approach to the ending
of war when he asserts: “Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of
the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.”1 By
this logic, and in the context of Afghanistan, the strategic dilemma associated
with how and when to end the war could have been avoided by engaging in a
rational cost-benefit analysis: how much has the war cost and what is the value
of the objectives we were pursuing? Once the former exceeded the latter, then
the Coalition should have struck a deal with the Taliban and left Afghanistan.
Instinctively, of course, we know that the decisions involved in ending a war
cannot be as simple as this rational cost-benefit analysis. But, why is that so?
One powerful argument blamed the ambiguous protraction of the
Afghanistan war on the West’s failure to comprehend and apply the principles
of classical strategic theory. Since in principle it should be no more difficult
to end a war than it is to start one, theoretically one need only adhere to the
precepts of an effective strategy to bring about the rational and purposeful end
to an armed conflict. The “bad strategy” argument views the difficulty associated with ending the war in Afghanistan as a failure to understand, or apply,
the principles of effective strategy—such as a clear and attainable end state,
adequate means or unity of effort—as a consequence of an emerging “strategic
illiteracy.” The argument presented is the West has been “out-strategized” by its
opponents.2 This article argues a different thesis: that, notwithstanding some of
the evident difficulties associated with the strategy adopted in Afghanistan, the
war there is a reflection of a much longer standing phenomenon— it is easier to
start conflicts than it is to end them.3 The fact that Afghanistan is one of many
such examples of problematic, protracted conflicts suggests that, in addition to
a range of specific difficulties associated with the peculiarities of the nation,
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there may be a range of broader structural challenges that contribute to making
the purposeful termination of a conflict an inherently problematic activity. Put
another way, wars can be difficult to end even when conscious, rigorous effort
is made to try and realize the best strategic practices.
This article addresses two themes: the recurrent structural problems
associated with ending a war, and how they have contributed to undermining
Coalition attempts to terminate the conflict in Afghanistan. In doing so this
author will investigate the significance to war termination of four questions
and the challenges associated with answering them: who will win; is there an
achievable peace; peace at what cost; and, can the war be terminated? Taken
together, the complexities surrounding the answers to these four questions
suggest, whatever the quality of one’s strategy-making, there are recurrent
structural factors present to a greater or lesser extent in all armed conflicts that
constrain the strategies that can be conceived and executed. If strategy is the art
of the possible, then many of the problems we have experienced in Afghanistan
result not from strategic illiteracy or a lack of understanding of what needs to
be done, but rather from inescapable dilemmas and contradictions inherent in
almost any attempt to end a conflict. If these problems are, in fact, inherent to
the activity of ending all wars, then whatever lessons we think we might learn
from our experiences in Afghanistan for the formulation of strategy, our challenges there will be open to repetition in the future.

Who Will Win?
One of the fundamental requirements for ending a war is that the belligerents’ views on the outcome begin to converge: this might be simultaneous
pessimism that the conflict has degenerated into a “mutually hurting stalemate”;
or it may be a tacit recognition that one or other of the sides cannot be stopped
from winning.4 In either case, the fundamental point is that while any of the
key belligerents believe that it is possible to improve their position in the future
by continuing, achieving peace is problematic. Even if a belligerent believes
that its position is likely to deteriorate, in the short to medium term, a belief
that circumstances may improve in the long term will encourage either side to
continue the conflict. Often this convergence can occur rather quickly, such as
occurred in the Six Day War of 1967. In the majority of cases, however, this
convergence occurs only after a prolonged period—witness the longevity of
many recent counterinsurgency campaigns. The answer to the question “who
will win” amounts to an assessment of how one is faring and how the future
looks. In other words, it is an evaluation of whether war is accomplishing a
belligerent’s objectives. The difficulties with answering this question explain
why so many conflicts are prolonged; in essence, performance in a particular
conflict is not self-evident.
In theory, one might expect armed conflict to result in a fairly rapid
process of strategic learning by both sides. The intense competition associated
with war can be expected to permit belligerents to quickly assess their opponent’s objectives, costs associated with the war, and relative strength of either

Autumn 2012

45

Christopher Tuck

side. Indeed, conflict may be the only forum in which information can be credibly communicated between the protagonists.5 It is this type of information that
will permit both sides to assess their progress. In theory, a conflict should end
when both sides agree on who has won or lost or who has the greatest potential for winning or losing.6 In reality, these judgments are extremely difficult.
Calculations regarding progress in a war will depend, among other things, on
the metrics used to measure success. Thus, US Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates was able to argue in March 2011 that the Coalition had made undeniable
progress in Afghanistan by citing two criteria: the expansion of areas defined
as secure, and the demoralization of the Taliban.7 One difficulty, though, is
finding appropriate metrics with which to measure progress in a conflict and
then deciding how best to measure them—should one measure success through
military objectives such as casualty rates or territory gained, or should the focus
be on political, economic, or social benchmarks? Military objectives are easier
to calculate but success through the use of military power needs to be evaluated
as a political concept: success is the attainment of the political objectives toward
which the use of military power is directed.8 War, however, is nonlinear; there
is no reliable relationship between the scale of military activity and the level of
political success.9
The problem of assessing progress in war is complicated by the fact
that such calculations are future-focused; one needs to know not only how they
are doing now but also how to extrapolate this knowledge into future trends.10
Unfortunately, the accuracy of predictions about the future cannot be verified
until the act occurs.11 Given the wide range of metrics and methodologies for
assessing them it is entirely possible for belligerents to “talk past one another”
on issues of current and future prospects. It is possible that both sides will
believe they are winning or at least think their circumstances will improve if
they persevere.12
In any case, since war is the realm of chance, even reasonable calculations can be upset by game-changing factors that invalidate existing assumptions
on the prospects for success. For example, history has numerous examples of
opponents who lost a conventional war, but sustained the fight by transforming to unconventional warfare as a means for changing the nature of the game,
invalidating the more conventional metrics utilized to measure success.13 Finally,
because of a lack of uncontested and objective facts related to the question of
whether war is working, there is a tendency for those analyzing the conflict to
substitute beliefs for facts, rendering the basis of a belligerent’s war termination
calculations subject to the power of particular narratives or rhetorical constructions: “peace with honor,” for example, or “no negotiation with terrorists.”14
These rationalizations challenge the capacity of states to plan and execute a
particular strategy; at the foundation of any effective strategy is a mechanism
for feedback and assessment—a belligerent needs to be able to reflect on the
execution of its ends, ways, and means relationship if it is to know whether it
is succeeding and whether some or all of these elements require adjustment.
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The preceding discussion is central to the challenges associated with
Coalition strategy development in Afghanistan. The introduction to this article
noted the challenges in Afghanistan are not primarily the result of strategic
illiteracy but derive from the difficulty in formulating an effective strategy.
For the Coalition, one of the crucial difficulties has been the fact that there has
been no consensus on whether the war is working. In complex nation-building
contexts, traditional concepts of military victory need to be replaced by what
Professor Robert Mandel refers to as “strategic success,” a concept that encompasses “inter-related informational, military, political, economic, social, and
diplomatic elements.”15 The metrics used to measure success need to reflect all
of these dimensions if they are to adequately capture the breadth of activities
required for true success. In consequence, the range of potential metrics with
which to measure success is vast, given that Coalition strategy in Afghanistan
encompasses such tasks as protecting the population; creating effective governance; encouraging socio-economic development; and enhancing the Afghan
security forces.16
These challenges are compounded by the questions of whether one
focuses on the local, regional, or national level of governance; whether the
focus is on key trends, and, if so, over what time period; what geographic area
one may favor; and how data should be categorized.17 Varying decisions on
these issues can produce radically different conclusions related to conditions in
Afghanistan. For example, in relation to national versus local economic conditions, nationally, Afghan gross national product (GNP) tripled to $12 billion in
the period between 2002 and 2006. Locally, however, such figures are meaningless in measuring the experience of ordinary Afghans. In 2009, less than
half the Afghan population had income of more than $100 a month. Various
polls indicate a growing perception that economic opportunities are worsening.18 What would appear to be a simple and valid metric becomes a morass.
In Afghanistan, there has been a wide range of difficulties impacting measures of success. There are, for example, process challenges related
to the fact there are multiple organizations gathering data, including the US
government, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/International Security
Assistance Force (NATO/ISAF), the United Nations (UN), and nongovernment
organizations. Each agency or organization often focuses on different metrics
or analyzes them in different ways, interpreting the data in a more optimistic or
pessimistic manner.19 Often institutional and bureaucratic factors shape preferences related to certain factors. The political scientist Anthony King notes that,
despite the rejection of such measures by senior British officers in Afghanistan,
there is a recurrent tendency for British units to measure the success of their
6-month tours in relation to body counts or the number of major operations
undertaken.20 There are key gaps in available data—more contested regions, for
example, are more problematic when attempting to gather data. In particular,
there are difficulties obtaining data related to the Pakistan border areas, resulting in a serious difficulty for what is recognized as an Afghanistan-Pakistan
(AfPAK) conflict.21 Even where there is sufficient data, it can be difficult to
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interpret. The author and political scientist Anthony Cordesman notes: “It is far
easier to quantify what is easily measured than to quantify what is relevant.”22
Relevant data relating to factors such as the quality of activity, its longevity, or
its effect on perceptions can be difficult to objectively discern.
Other challenges are created by the relationship between metrics.
Framing a set of relevant metrics is difficult enough—framing a set of metrics
that weigh, deconflict, integrate, and relate military, political, economic, social,
political, and informational activities and objectives is a completely separate
issue. Because they are interrelated, a minimum level of success in each dimension may be required for achieving overall success. It may be difficult, however,
to achieve success simultaneously across the entire spectrum of the conflict.
Indeed, the case may well be that success in one dimension appears mutually exclusive of success in another. For example, military objectives may be
achieved at the expense of political objectives and vice versa.23 This problem has
been a recurrent feature of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the past.
In Afghanistan, the trade-offs are even more complex because of the breadth
and variation in objectives. For example, pushing forward on goals for social
transformation such as greater gender equality creates political difficulties from
Afghan traditionalists; drastically increasing the size of the Afghan security
forces shows progress in building the capacity of the Afghan government, but
it can come at a cost locally where security forces are often perceived as partial,
corrupt sources of insecurity.24 Paradoxically, success in one dimension may
require accepting a measure of failure in another if the worst aspects of these
incompatibilities are to be avoided. If, as some have argued, the key challenge
in Afghanistan is defining a realistic notion of success “somewhere between
ideal and intolerable,”25 how much failure is acceptable? In 2010, 59 percent
of Afghans listed corruption as their key concern (even more than security).
At the same time, however, the authors Chaudri and Farrell note that corruption is also the “bedrock of the Afghan government”; without the capacity to
use such inducements, many local administrators would be unable to govern
effectively.26 So, what level of corruption represents success in reconciling
the competing needs of the perceptions of ordinary Afghans and the practical
needs of the Afghan government?
Cumulatively, the lack of objective metrics with which to judge the
progress in Afghanistan has a number of effects on assessing the performance
of the Coalition’s strategy. One effect has been the tendency to fill gaps in
our knowledge with beliefs—for example, to assume the Taliban are always
unpopular.27 Another effect has been to encourage the use of analogies in
assessments of strategy as a replacement for metrics, especially the use of experiences in Iraq to inform judgments on the effectiveness of particular strategies
in Afghanistan.28 Another impact has been to avoid for as long as possible
the creation of symbolic metrics of failure, such as the withdrawal of forces.
As evident in recent years, once the debate on the drawdown was initiated,
Coalition leverage in Afghanistan declined.29 The difficulty in defining objective metrics for success has encouraged the use of rhetorical metrics—metrics
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that sound plausible but are divorced from any obvious means of measurement.
For example, Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal argued to senators before
assuming command in Afghanistan that new goals were needed and that, in
consequence, “the measure of effectiveness will not be the number of enemy
killed. It will be the number of Afghans shielded from violence.”30
One of the clear difficulties faced by the Coalition in Afghanistan are
the challenges associated with assessing which elements of our strategy are
succeeding, which are failing, why, and whether continuation of the conflict
might improve the Coalition’s chances for success. This problem has afflicted
the academic debate related to the strategy in Afghanistan. Even when elements of the strategy embody similar assumptions (for example, that Coalition
success is problematic; that a scaling back of obligations might be required; that
the Afghanistan and Pakistan issues are inextricably linked; or that the Afghan
government is part of the problem), the prescriptions differ. Initiatives could
include negotiating with elements of the Taliban; jettisoning democratization
as a goal and focusing on a workable Afghan government; or, instead, prioritizing multilateral solutions that include Iran and decentralization of the Afghan
state.31 Ambiguities surrounding metrics have a direct and profound impact on
policymakers. The challenges associated with measuring progress bedevilled
President Obama’s Afghanistan strategy review, mainly because it proved difficult to assess which aspects of the existing strategy were performing, which
were not, and what milestones might be set to measure any alternative.32
This resulted in a view over the years (maybe the correct one) that it
was possible to win in Afghanistan or, at least, not to lose badly if we remained
there but adjusted elements of the strategy. The British author and politician
Rory Stewart observes a recurring mantra, an “astonishing chanted liturgy,”
regarding the views of consecutive ISAF commanders: “Each new general in
Afghanistan from 2002 to 2011 suggested the situation he had inherited was
dismal; implied that this was because his predecessor had the wrong resources
or strategy; and asserted that he now had the resources, strategy, and leadership
to deliver a decisive year.”33 This recurring rhetorical construction is directly
attributable to the lack of objective evidence related to whether the strategy was
succeeding; it did provide, however, the basis for continuing the conflict.

Is There an Achievable Peace?
The fact that success and failure in war is often not self-evident is one
dynamic that creates a propensity to continue the fighting; it was simply not
clear if we were winning or losing, and this ambiguity left open the possibility
for future success. There is a second critical issue that encapsulates another
powerful set of factors that make war termination problematic. This question is
whether there is any possibility to achieve peace? Even if belligerents conclude
the conflict is not succeeding this does not necessarily mean it will result in a
political compromise. The decision to terminate a conflict requires at least a
chance that some viable solution does exist, even if no specific political solution
is offered.34 Viable political solutions require both sides have some objectives
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that are compatible and realizable. Lacking these conditions, belligerents will
continue to fight even when they believe doing so has ceased to provide an
opportunity for victory.35
The difficulty in visualizing an acceptable way out of war normally
occurs in value-based conflicts. In conflict, the objectives pursued by belligerents can be divided into two types: interest based or value based. Interest-based
conflicts tend to be disputes over tangibles (such as territory) and feature a basic
level of common understanding between the belligerents about the nature of
their dispute and the rules by which it can be resolved—the Cabinet Wars of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would be an example. On the other hand,
value-based conflicts are far more focused on intangible sources of dispute
such as beliefs, or competing nationalisms. Value-based conflicts often involve
goals that are highly ideological and intensely held; they are often needs-based
or transcendental and driven by deeply held mental images of the opposition.36
In value-based conflicts, the belligerent is more likely to place an importance
on achieving objectives than on the costs incurred.37 For this reason, valuebased wars associated with identity or secession appear to be more difficult
to resolve than issue-based conflicts that are often based on economic and
political tangibles.38
Afghanistan might appear to be an issue-based conflict; a war of choice:
a nation-building intervention in another country focused on counterterrorism,
establishing democracy, the rule of law, or a market economy; a conflict quite
distinct from the zero-sum war of survival that normally drives value-based
conflicts. There has, nevertheless, been a strong value-led dimension to the
Coalition’s commitment in Afghanistan, particularly from a US point of view.
It is a conflict in which the costs of failure were portrayed as profoundly negative and the benefits of victory as extensive and enduring. The foundation for
this was provided by the 9/11 attacks on the United States and served as a
catalyst for the invasion of Afghanistan. It was the Global War on Terror that
provided the broader context in which the cost-benefit calculations related to
Afghanistan were then positioned. The Global War on Terror, and by extension
the war in Afghanistan, was presented in essentialist terms by US policymakers: the enemies were relentless; the threat posed was a direct and dangerous
one; the struggle against these forces was a vital one for the long-term security
of the United States.39 While President Bush’s justification for the intervention
in Afghanistan incorporated a number of objectives, such as democratization,
building a free society, and establishing an ally in the war on terror, a core and
recurring theme was the link between the war in Afghanistan and the Global
War on Terror.40
The difficulty in developing a successful strategy for Afghanistan has
been the fact that, as long as the strategic objectives are posed in essentialist
terms and victory has been portrayed as absolutely necessary, a range of alternative strategies examining any possible compromise has been excluded. Words
alone do not make a conflict value-laden. But President Bush’s characterization
of the Afghan war in value-based terms resonated with the American public,
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and, indeed, elsewhere, resulting in high levels of support for the conflict in
the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and other nations. In contrast to the
war in Iraq, Western public opinion tended to view the initial intervention in
Afghanistan favourably.41 In the United States, at least, there continued to be
the belief that the original decision to invade Afghanistan was correct even if
there was growing criticism as to how the campaign was conducted.42 Indeed,
while President Obama attempted to reshape US foreign policy rhetoric, the net
effect of his efforts was greater attention on Afghanistan rather than less. In
trying to distance himself from President Bush’s focus on Iraq, he argued that it
was Afghanistan that was the real frontline in the struggle against terrorism.43
While the Obama administration has dropped the term Global War on Terror,
the administration continues to stress the threat to US vital interests posed by
international terrorism and the centrality of Afghanistan (and its relationship
with Pakistan) as an integral part of that threat.44
Given the value-based dimension of the war in Afghanistan, it is not
difficult to discern why there was always a tendency to persevere, even if the
military results were ambiguous and the range of acceptable strategies constrained. The value-based aspect of a conflict cannot simply be turned off by
the government. The objectives imputed to the struggle in Afghanistan are
high; the sacrifices of citizens and soldiers are sanctified by the importance of
those objectives; and the escalating costs are justified in terms of vital interests.
Given the existential nature of the struggle, as it was initially presented, dissent
could be delegitimized as unpatriotic, pro-al Qaeda, or antimilitary.
Movement in relation to relieving a portion of the value-based elements of the strategy has clearly been discernable. In March 2009, President
Obama articulated more defined goals that focused on the defeat of al Qaeda in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, although the associated objectives continued to span
a complex array of nation-building activities in Afghanistan.45 At the same time,
debate emerged surrounding the value of adopting more limited objectives,
such as a de facto partition of Afghanistan46 or at least developing a narrower
measure of success focused on “security and stability in local terms and not
the conversion to Western values and an idealized concept of democracy.”47 A
willingness to accept more limited objectives resulted in a serious debate over
the validity of limited approaches, such as Vice President Joe Biden’s “light
footprint” idea, embodying special operation forces and remote attack.48 In
particular, the preconditions directed at negotiations with the Taliban, including the requirement they accept the Afghan constitution and dissolve all ties
with al Qaeda, were dropped.49 The Obama administration moved to a “fight,
talk, and build” strategy in which negotiation is a crucial plank.50 The notion
that some of the Taliban constitute actors legitimate enough to negotiate with
represents an important symbolic shift from value-based thinking.

Peace at What Cost?
Even assuming that a belligerent comes to believe that his position in
a war is likely to deteriorate over the long term and an acceptable political
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compromise is conceivable, there are obstacles that may encourage the continuation of the conflict. These obstacles are reflected in the third vital war
termination question: peace at what cost? The costs referred to by this question refer to the giving up of wider objectives that are indirectly linked to the
conflict in question. Put another way, winning the war may become only one
(and sometimes not even the most critical) of the reasons to continue fighting.
The truth is that war often supports policy goals associated with the political
survival of governments or the prestige and credibility of a state. Often in these
circumstances, fighting may become an end in itself.
Domestically, a number of political actors derive side benefits from a
conflict, whether they be economic, political, or psychological—terminating a
war may incur substantial costs.51 For political leaders survival in office is a
basic objective.52 A leader’s personal stake in the progress of a conflict may be
quite high given the fact that success or failure in the conflict may have a direct
impact on their prestige and survival.53 Elites who might otherwise negotiate
or accept a settlement will fear internal opposition from rivals or constituents
who would view any negotiations as a sellout, act of treason, or an indication
of incompetence and mismanagement of the conflict.54 It is not unreasonable
to expect the leadership might lose power as a result of opposition by those
constituencies who expect current policies to be defended to the bitter end.55
Such a settlement can be a powerful blow to the self-esteem for a particular
leader, especially when the leader has based his image on the success of the
state.56 This is especially true of leaders closely associated with the decision
to go to war. They are likely to fear any settlement that cannot be portrayed
as victory. Leaders may be unwilling to countenance peace until all options
have been tried and failed.57 Even then, they may insist on continuing to fight
through fear of punishment. Certain domestic contexts can be problematic in
this respect; for example, when leaders are charismatic populists who rely on
heroic achievement, a call for peace without victory can be career (and possibly
life) threatening.58 Cumulatively, the compromises required for peace can make
selling a victory a difficult proposition. This explains why leadership tends to
change when the time comes to formalize the peace.59
For the reasons outlined, any attempt at compromise risked serious
damage to the political fortunes of those associated with the Bush administration. President Bush’s hawkish foreign policy was a political asset for much of
his tenure. As the architect of the war, and having been involved for such an
extended time in arguing for its necessity and the viability of long-term success,
a major shift in his administration’s policy was unlikely. The Bush administration returned again and again to the idea that, despite the rising costs, progress
was being made and victory remained a possibility. In speeches, President Bush
asserted that “we are winning the war on terror”60; “we have seen the turning
of the tide”61; “we are making progress”62; and “We will not waiver, we will
not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.”63 It not surprising, then, that
dramatic changes to the United States’ war termination strategy only evolved
once the Bush administration had been replaced.64
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Externally, states continue to fight because, even if they are not winning,
ending a conflict might weaken political commitments given to various allies
or undermine the deterrence directed at adversaries. War may, therefore, be
useful in the context of a broader struggle; in other words, the leadership may
feel the costs associated with the current conflict need to be weighed against
its overall value. Perhaps the conflict serves as a source of information or in
sending messages related to the belligerents’ resolve. Governments in conflict
are inclined to shape the perceptions of multiple audiences on issues related
to resolve, willingness to compromise, or a willingness to sustain the costs
of the conflict.65 These issues can become especially pernicious because they
have a circular logic—the longer a war continues, the more political capital is
invested, and the more politically damaging any failure can be, so the greater
the incentive to persevere in the hope that something positive might materialize—perseverance that often increases the costs associated with failure.
Paradoxically, the prospect of negotiations may itself extend conflict; a good
example is when belligerents continue to fight beyond the initial objectives or
pre-established limits in the hope of creating a more secure postwar environment. Such a situation may develop when one side is trying to create bargaining
chips for future negotiations.66 In such cases, these new or expanded interests
often decrease the sensitivity of the belligerent to the associated costs of continuing the fight.
These imperatives help explain the nature of the war in Afghanistan.
Defeat avoidance, because of the belief that this would have damaging repercussions for US policy, has become one of the themes in arguing for perseverance.
In July 2010, Senator Joseph Lieberman, Chairman of the Homeland Security
committee, argued that defeat in Afghanistan would energize extremism “all
around the world . . . . And it’ll be a tremendous cutdown in America’s prestige and credibility in the world.”67 Such arguments related to credibility and
prestige are powerful because they have an intuitive logic and are difficult to
objectively disprove. The prestige argument is particularly powerful because,
as author Stephen Biddle notes, a rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan would
carry with it a set of risks that would be hard to predict or control. There is
the possibility that a rapid withdrawal might be accompanied by “nightmarish
imagery” deriving from the collapse of the existing Afghan government.68

Can the War be Terminated?
Even assuming that the costs of peace were judged as acceptable, there
is a final obstacle that must still be overcome if a conflict is to end. This obstacle
is embodied in the question “can the war be terminated?” Even when the leaders
of a nation or faction have decided that the conflict should be terminated and
they are willing to accept the costs of peace, the question remains as to whether
the peace can be accepted by political constituencies whose cooperation is
required to effect the termination of the conflict. This issue is essentially a
question of political autonomy—to what extent is the leadership of a belligerent
beholden to other constituencies?
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Sometimes the decision of a single leader is the same as that of the state
as a whole. In 1991 Iraq capitulated because Saddam Hussein made that decision.
In general, though, most leaders rely to a greater or lesser extent on a variety of
political actors in order to exercise power. This may be the electorate, media,
oligarchs, military, allies, or other political factions. Autonomy has internal and
external dimensions. Internally, peace has to be sold to those groups that keep
the leadership in power; for example, the governing party or political allies.69
Domestic politics can be decisive in war termination calculations.70 In fact, war
termination often constitutes one of the most divisive and problematic policy
changes for decisionmakers mainly due to the intense emotional, psychological, and political issues associated with conflict termination. It can result in an
extreme polarization of views within a society, especially if the outcome of
war is less favorable than what was expected, or some deeply held national
values are challenged.71 Externally, when a war has been internationalized,
peace has to be sold to other “war-oriented actors,” allies or sponsors for either
side, or third parties whose agreement or acquiescence is required to produce
an acceptable settlement.72 Power is relevant to this problem; a belligerent’s
strategic leverage over war-oriented actors may be crucial if the objectives one
wishes to achieve are at odds with those of other actors. Where one party lacks
strategic leverage over its allies or other war-oriented actors it may face a challenge from an “intractable ally,” a situation where an ally obstructs any feasible
settlement.73
Taken in this context, the challenge for the Coalition is the structure
of the conflict in Afghanistan, which has linkages between intra- and extraAfghanistan conflict dynamics—Afghanistan constitutes only part of a larger
regional conflict.74 Peace in Afghanistan is conditional on the cooperation of its
neighbors.75 The recognition of this arrangement is reflected in the articulation
of the AfPAK concept—a concept embodying inextricable linkages between
the politics associated with the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and at the
same time recognizing that resolving the former requires the resolution of issues
in the latter and vice versa.76 The autonomy problem is one the United States
has only a limited capacity to influence when it comes to other “war-oriented
actors.” This is most readily seen in America’s relationship with Pakistan, an
ally but one with deep reservations regarding US policy in the region.77 At
the same time, the United States has become increasingly willing to criticize
Pakistan’s ties to elements of the Taliban.78 Pakistan’s relationship with the
Taliban is ambiguous. While Taliban and Pakistan forces have been involved
periodically in heavy fighting, Pakistan has been inclined to sustain links with
the Taliban. This relationship is based on Pakistan’s view that Afghanistan is
a major player in their conflict with India. From Pakistan’s perspective, the
Karzai government is pro-Indian; from the Indian point of view the Taliban are
seen as a potential Pakistan-sponsored catalyst for their conflict in Kashmir.79
But the autonomy problem extends to other actors. There are a wide range
of regional actors whose cooperation or at least acquiescence is required to
construct a comprehensive strategy for a stable peace; these include Russia,
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China, Turkey, India, and Iran. While many of these actors are not friends
of the Taliban, they are suspicious of US intentions in the region. They are
also suspicious of each other; Iran and Pakistan have a long history of conflict
with regard to Afghanistan. All of these challenges have made it much more
difficult for the United States to develop a comprehensive strategy.80 Nor have
allies proved as malleable as the United States might have hoped. For example,
it has been clear since at least 2009 that the United States’ NATO allies were
focused on withdrawing their forces from Afghanistan, irrespective of whether
the Americans approved or not.81
Internally, the key autonomy issue is linked to public opinion, although
its effect on the entire scope of government policy has proven paradoxical. It
might be assumed that, in small wars, public opinion plays a key role in bringing
an end to the conflict once the costs begin to mount. In Afghanistan, however,
the war was generally popular for a long period of time, creating incentives to
continue the fight—the government had a high degree of autonomy to continue
the conflict aided by public support of nearly 90 percent. Additionally, events
in Afghanistan were largely removed from public scrutiny by the controversies
surrounding the Iraq war and its aftermath.82 The administration wished to
continue the fight, and there was little internal opposition to prevent them from
doing so. Despite a shift in public opinion related to the war, President Obama’s
autonomy within the domestic parameters associated with Afghanistan questions was more limited than one might suppose. Part of the rationale for the
intransigence in US policy related to Afghanistan was caused by the manner in
which the administration was able to draw on the rhetoric associated with the
war on terror. The administration was able to draw on preexisting ideas and
policies articulated as far back as the Reagan presidency.83 President Obama
was successful in shifting the nature of the debate to the larger issues of the
Afghan war and away from issues such as troop strength. This focus on the
broader political questions associated with bringing an end to the war was
possible because the president was able to reduce the Pentagon’s role in the
decisionmaking process and successfully replace some key personnel.84
Domestic political conditions remained problematic, however, even
after 2008. As late as September 2009, polling reflected mixed views on the
Afghanistan conflict. A poll in September 2009 had 43 percent in favor of withdrawing forces from Afghanistan as soon as possible, but 50 percent thought
US troops should remain until “the situation had stabilized.” One of the more
interesting facts was that 76 percent of those surveyed still saw the possibility
of the Taliban regaining control of Afghanistan and they viewed that possibility as a major threat to the well-being of the United States.85 Thus, even the
Obama election victory did not represent a ringing mandate for withdrawal
from Afghanistan. Another difficulty was the structure of the opposition to the
war. There was a high degree of consensus among the elite liberal establishment related to the belief that Afghanistan was a just and potentially winnable
war. This was especially true among academics and political commentators.86
While 37 percent of Democrats wanted US forces to remain in Afghanistan,
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support for staying the course was almost twice a strong (71 percent) among
Republicans.87 Given this situation, the prospect of terminating the Afghan war
by means of significant concessions risked reinforcing the traditional perception of the weakness of the Democratic Party on the issue of defense, giving
the Republicans a platform from which to attack the president. In addition, any
precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan would generate friction from a substantial minority within the Democratic Party that supported the war, making
cooperation on other major issues even more problematic for the president.88
Indeed, as a response to the possibility of appearing weak, President Obama
and the Democrats used Afghanistan as the means with which to balance their
criticism of the Iraq war. This position permitted the president to enhance his
attack on the Bush administration’s Iraq policy with promises to “get tough”
in Aghanistan.89
At the root of President Obama’s problems lay the fact that the rhetoric
of President Bush resonated with the American people. The development of
a strategy for Afghanistan, its motives, costs, and benefits established under
the Bush administration was a powerful influence, not because it was based
on incontestable fact but because it was socially acceptable. As the political
scientist and author Richard Jackson notes, the war on terror had become
“culturally and materially embedded within US politics and society.”90 In the
short term, the scope for rhetorical innovation, of radical changes in the narrative, was limited.91 Afghanistan was viewed at its inception as a just war and
any unpopularity stemmed not from a collapse in the perceived validity of the
broader war on terror argument, but from a public perception that the war on the
ground was being lost.92 Even if the war in Afghanistan had become unpopular,
the conflict was still inextricably entwined with a broader threat narrative that
continued to be effective. By the time President Obama took office, the war on
terror debate, its language, logic, analogies, and metaphors had become normalized; he was trapped by the core assumptions prevalent among the American
public.93 For this reason, the president continued to assert that he would do
whatever it takes to defeat the Taliban,94 an approach accompanied by parallel
moves—troop surges, the extension of drone operations, and an expansion of
activities in Pakistan.

Conclusion
The challenges associated with operations in Afghanistan have not been
primarily due to any strategic illiteracy; they are problems directly related to war
termination. The problems experienced by the Coalition have been witnessed
in any number of other wars, both recent and past. Examining the situation
from an historical perspective, Afghanistan is far from unique. The war theorist
and author John Vasquez notes that there is a tendency for wars to become
sticky or stabilized; in other words, belligerents often continue to pursue war
beyond the point at which, with hindsight, it might have ended.95 Indeed, policy
stability may be self-reinforcing; cumulatively, mutually reinforcing problems
associated with the four questions analyzed in this article may lead to what
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the authors Stanley and Sawyer term “negative duration dependence,” i.e., the
longer wars continue, the harder they are to terminate.96
Professor Chaim Kaufmann notes that in such circumstances only major
shocks can alter policy, “Change only occurs when a particular experience is too
salient to be ignored, too unambiguous to be discounted, and so squarely in
conflict with the prior belief that it becomes cognitively cheaper to abandon the
belief than to try to resolve or to tolerate the inconsistency.”97 In Afghanistan,
however, there has been no single shock of such a magnitude that it has revolutionized the war termination debate. Change has come incrementally. In a
sense, the death of Osama bin Laden had a catalytic effect, allowing the United
States to distinguish between its struggle against al Qaeda and its fight with
the Taliban.98 In this particular case, President Obama has been able to refocus
metrics for success by redefining the metrics according to what has already been
achieved. In this respect, following bin Laden’s death, the Obama administration has made a concerted effort to focus the public on its successes in disrupting
al Qaeda.99 But even in this context, bin Laden’s death merely reinforced an
existing trend in the gradual narrative bifurcation of the Taliban and al Qaeda.
The primary difficulty in Afghanistan is the problem of answering the
question “how are we doing?” The complexity of the policy goals has made it
difficult to discern whether the Coalition has been succeeding or not, and which
of our ends, ways, and means has been successful. On its own, this problem
might have resulted in an early end to the war; or, at least, a reassessment of
ends, as well as relooking the ways and means. The answers to the remaining
key war termination questions (is there an achievable peace, peace at what
cost, and can the war be terminated) have resulted in a strategy of protraction
in the hope that something positive will turn up. The value-based aspects of
the war in Afghanistan made it difficult to consider any legitimate outcome
other than total victory. The political costs of compromise have grown for those
who initiated the war in terms of the domestic political credibility of Coalition
decisionmakers and the international prestige of the states involved. Even
when willingness to compromise on specific goals has emerged, the United
States government has demonstrated a lack of internal and external autonomy
capable of constructing a viable alternative. Beating ourselves anew with the
birch branches of Clausewitz will not produce miraculous solutions to these
challenges. Indeed, these issues reinforce Colin Gray’s point that “strategic
thinking is difficult; indeed, strategy is so difficult to do well that it is remarkable that it is ever practiced successfully.”100
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